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Targeting population nutrition through municipal health and food policy: 
Implications of New York City's experiences in regulatory obesity prevention 
Abstract 
Obesity remains a major public health challenge across OECD countries and policy-makers globally 
require successful policy precedents. This paper analyzes New York City’s innovative experiences in 
regulatory approaches to nutrition. We combined a systematic documentary review and key informant 
interviews (n = 9) with individuals directly involved in nutrition policy development and decision-making. 
Thematic analysis was guided by Kingdon’s three-streams-model and the International Obesity Task 
Force’s evidence-based decision-making framework. Our findings indicate that decisive mayoral 
leadership spearheaded initial agenda-change and built executive capacity to support evidence-driven 
policy. Policy-makers in the executive branch recognized the dearth of evidence for concrete policy 
interventions, and made contributing to the evidence base an explicit goal. Their approach preferred 
decision-making through executive action and rules passed by the Board of Health that successfully 
banned trans-fats from food outlets, set institutional food standards, introduced menu labeling 
requirements for chain restaurants, and improved access to healthy foods for disadvantaged populations. 
Although the Health Department collaborated with the legislature on legal and programmatic food access 
measures, there was limited engagement with elected representatives and the community on regulatory 
obesity prevention. Our analysis suggests that this hurt the administration’s ability to successfully 
communicate the public health messages motivating these contentious proposals; contributing to 
unexpected opposition from food access and minority advocates, and fueling charges of executive 
overreach. Overall, NYC presents a case of expert-driven policy change, underpinned by evidence-based 
environmental approaches. The city’s experience demonstrates that there is scope to redefine municipal 
responsibilities for public health and that incremental change and contentious public discussion can 
impact social norms around nutrition. 
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1 
Lessons from New York City’s experiences in targeting population-level nutritional 1 
intake: a case study in regulatory obesity prevention policy 2 
Sisnowski J, Street JM and Braunack-Mayer A, School of Public Health, University of 3 
Adelaide  4 
Contact: jackie.street@adelaide.edu.au 5 
1. Introduction 6 
During Michael Bloomberg’s 12 year tenure as mayor, his administration actively promoted 7 
New York City (NYC) as a trailblazer of international significance in chronic disease 8 
prevention.1,2 Publications by successive City Health Commissioners and Department of Health 9 
(DOHMH) staff have appeared in the media and academic journals, outlining city policy choices 10 
aimed at improving population nutrition and advocating for complementary interventions at 11 
higher jurisdictional levels.e.g.3-9 Some regulatory proposals have been subjected to lawsuits10-12 12 
or rejected at higher jurisdictional levels.13,14 Others have been replicated elsewhere: for 13 
example, calorie posting imposed on chain restaurants has been brought to federal level in 14 
slightly modified form.15 Descriptive accounts and early evaluations of new rules directly 15 
connected to obesity prevention or to healthy food access more generally have been published 16 
by public agencies and academics.e.g.16-24 However, the broad NYC experience as an 17 
unprecedented policy effort has gone largely unexamined. In this paper, we provide an in-depth 18 
analysis of policy-making in obesity prevention during the Bloomberg mayoralty. Our findings, 19 
while specific to New York City, can inform political discussions and guide other jurisdictions 20 
on the feasibility and acceptability of different regulatory options.  21 
2. Methods 22 
2.1. Conceptual framework 23 
We have used two complementary frameworks to underpin project development and analysis 24 
of the findings. Firstly, we draw on Kingdon’s multiple-stream-model25 which offers a generic, 25 
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process-oriented representation of the macro-forces and key actors that shape policy-making. 26 
Kingdon focuses on agenda-setting, i.e. the process preceding legislative or executive decision-27 
making. He conceptualizes successful policy-making as the result of a brief coupling of 28 
otherwise largely independent streams of problem identification, policy solution, and politics. A 29 
focusing event, electoral change, or a rapid shift in public opinion open up a limited window of 30 
opportunity seized by “policy entrepreneurs”. 25 These individuals “hook solutions to problems, 31 
proposals to political momentum, and political events to policy solutions.”25, p. 182 Kingdon argues 32 
that processes within the policy and politics streams differ: thematic agenda-setting occurs 33 
suddenly in the political stream, whereas the definition of potential solutions that may eventually 34 
become statutory provisions proceeds incrementally in the policy stream.25  Similarly, in the 35 
expert-driven policy stream, consensus is achieved through “processes of persuasion and 36 
diffusion [in which] ideas survive scrutiny according to a set of criteria”,25, p.159 whereas political 37 
agreement is reached by bargaining around varied interests.23 Assuming that solutions are 38 
flexible and pre-date political opportunity, he suggests that the entrepreneurs “try to make 39 
linkages far before windows open so they can bring a prepackaged combination of solution, 40 
problem, and political momentum to the window when it does open.”25, p.183 41 
Secondly, we draw on Swinburn and colleagues’ evidence-based decision-making 42 
framework, developed on behalf of the International Obesity Task Force (IOTF).26 It 43 
complements Kingdon’s focus on parallel processes with a modelling of policy-making as a 44 
sequence of actions. The framework identifies five consecutive key actions for successful 45 
development and implementation of policy interventions to address obesity: (1) making a case 46 
for policy action, (2) identifying causes and contributors and corresponding intervention levers, 47 
(3) defining possible interventions and their respective contexts, (4) prospectively evaluating 48 
potential measures, and (5) developing a comprehensive policy program combining 49 
complementary interventions.26 Together, these two conceptual models provide a comprehensive 50 
explanatory framework for the processes and components of policy-making.  51 
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We used a case study methodology which is well suited to “retain the holistic and meaningful 52 
characteristics of real-life events”,27, p.4 while using a wide range of evidence.27 The two-stage 53 
data collection process comprised a document review and key informant interviews. The choice 54 
of NYC as our case study and the subsequent selection of interviewees followed a non-55 
probability, purposive sampling approach.28 NYC was chosen in accordance with extreme case 56 
sampling,28 as the city has been exceptional compared to other OECD jurisdictions in terms of 57 
the timing, content and reach of the regulatory measures considered and implemented. In 58 
addition, NYC has an exceptionally large and diverse population estimated at more than 59 
8,400,000 as of July 2013, more than twice the population of the next biggest US City.29 The 60 
city’s size is matched by extraordinary local administrative resources.6 Additionally, the much 61 
larger metropolitan area30 has been ranked as the fifth most racially and ethnically diverse metro 62 
area in the country.31 New York City itself is also more socioeconomically unequal than the 63 
United States at large, with a significantly higher per capita income, but a higher share of persons 64 
living below poverty level.29,32 Following the logic of stakeholder sampling,28 internal study 65 
validity is constructed by identifying a maximally complete set of relevant stakeholders. In the 66 
absence of probability sampling, external validity in case study research is achieved not through 67 
sample size and valid inferences about the underlying population, but through qualitative 68 
analysis leading to potentially generalizable theoretical propositions.27 69 
The goal of this study is to deliver an in-depth analysis of the policy-making processes around 70 
NYC’s dietary obesity prevention efforts and the various factors that shaped their content. We 71 
have concentrated on accounts from policy-makers, notably civil servants and appointed and 72 
elected leaders. These stakeholders possess knowledge of all stages of the policy-making 73 
process. We have not included the views of the food industry as the foremost representatives of 74 
private interests. These have been widely analyzed and found to be largely uniform and 75 
predictable in response to government interventions targeting population nutritione.g.33-64 and 76 
considerable attention has focused on the inherent conflicts of interest these stakeholders hold.35-77 
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39 Our approach was to explore the influence of the food industry on the policy process through 78 
the documentary review and policy-makers’ accounts.  79 
2.2. Data collection and analysis 80 
The document review encompassed relevant research articles and policy documents from 81 
2002, when Mayor Bloomberg took office, to August 2014. As summarized in figure 1, we 82 
conducted systematic searches of PubMed, the New York Academy of Medicine’s grey literature 83 
repository GreyLit, and the DOHMH website for research articles, reports, and policy documents 84 
pertaining to NYC-specific regulatory obesity prevention efforts. Review data informed the 85 
development of the key informant interview schedule and complemented evidence emerging 86 
from interviews. <figure 1 here>  87 
Potential participants were selected based on their professional role. We established an initial 88 
list of possible interviewees based on authorship of and/or mention in policy documents and 89 
research articles identified during the document review. We then used snowball sampling to 90 
recruit additional participants by asking interviewees to recommend colleagues they considered 91 
important informants based on level of involvement in relevant policy-making processes. Sixteen 92 
interview requests were submitted, with nine requests granted. Prior to interview, all participants 93 
were informed about project aims and confidentiality arrangements and provided written 94 
consent. Of the seven individuals approached who did not participate, two declined and five did 95 
not respond to multiple direct contact attempts. Seven face-to-face interviews of 50-70 minutes 96 
in length took place in the United States between September and November 2014. Two shorter 97 
interviews were conducted by e-mail in November and December 2014. Ethics approval was 98 
obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (approval 99 
number H-2014-122).  100 
Data analysis followed a qualitative, inductive process through thematic analysis: the 101 
development of theoretical strands from the data was based on initial free line-by-line coding 102 
followed by organization of codes into descriptive themes, and development of analytical 103 
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themes.40 This approach mirrors the coding process along a developmental path from open 104 
coding to selective coding.41 Concurrent initial coding of completed interviews was performed 105 
to adjust the general direction of questioning, if necessary, as well as to inform specific questions 106 
in subsequent interviews. All transcripts were initially coded by [author 1]. [Author 2] 107 
independently coded the first four interviews, after which [authors 1+2] compared and discussed 108 
codes. [Author 1] then re-coded all interviews according to the combined list of codes and 109 
resulting broader themes. These and additional methodological details are documented in the 110 
online supplementary data. 111 
3. Findings 112 
A number of major themes of relevance to successful policy development and 113 
implementation in the area of nutrition-related obesity prevention emerged from the interviews 114 
and document review (see the online appendix for a categorized overview of publications 115 
identified). In the following, we use Kingdon’s and the IOTF’s approaches as the explanatory 116 
frameworks within which we present the findings from this case study. We begin with an analysis 117 
of the drivers of policy initiation, followed by a discussion of the role that evidence played in 118 
policy design and justification. We then explore feasibility considerations and expert-driven 119 
decision-making as two pivotal constants during the Bloomberg era. The place of regulatory 120 
obesity prevention within the wider health and social policy agenda is discussed with particular 121 
emphasis on stakeholders’ diverging views on food access. Finally, we review the limitations of 122 
New York’s expert-driven regulatory approach to obesity prevention and present lessons-learned 123 
as well as recommendations offered by policy-makers there. 124 
3.1. Executive leadership and agency expertise as a catalyst for policy development 125 
All sources agreed that Mayor Bloomberg’s personal interest and political investment in 126 
chronic disease prevention was instrumental in establishing and advancing a policy agenda in 127 
this area. His election and tenure were clearly identified as a window of opportunity:  128 
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“You need the political will to get it done; in other words, you would need a mayor as well as 129 
a commissioner [or] other appointed official, to be able to say, this is the policy that needs to 130 
be developed and this is why. […] We did always think of Bloomberg as the public health 131 
mayor, and we knew that we were there in what I call the golden age of public health in New 132 
York City.” (Interviewee 5, DOHMH) 133 
Bloomberg also fits Kingdon’s description of a prototypical policy entrepreneur whose “defining 134 
characteristic, much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their 135 
resources- time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money”25, p.123:  136 
“Public health is always a tough sell politically. Mayor Bloomberg did it because he believed 137 
in it. Because he saw the numbers and he thought saving lives was a good thing. He was one 138 
of the few elected officials that got it and he also was unusual in that he didn’t really care too 139 
much about his public image. […] We needed him, his approval, for anything important we 140 
wanted to do.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 141 
Indeed, Bloomberg’s election started a coupling of political and policy streams: a member of 142 
the political realm, he hooked the political will to explore and enact regulatory action to the 143 
policy stream. However, rather than presenting an endpoint where policy development moves 144 
into to concrete decision-making, the initial years were devoted to internal capacity building. 145 
This finding appears at odds with Kingdon’s proposition that pitch-ready policy solutions need 146 
to be available as soon as a political event opens a window of opportunity. Instead, in this case, 147 
a policy entrepreneur, whose election in itself represented a window of opportunity, initially set 148 
about creating conditions for policy change. An integral part of this strategy was the installation 149 
of lower-level policy entrepreneurs to drive the effort at a technical level. Thus, commitment to 150 
and expertise in chronic disease prevention was built throughout the health department hierarchy: 151 
the first Health Commissioner of the Bloomberg era, Thomas Frieden, handpicked by the 152 
Mayor,42 was described as the fulcrum for concrete policy change: 153 
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“He doesn’t wait for other people to generate things from the bottom up. He just says ‘this is 154 
what we need to do, here’s how we’re going to do it, let’s go’.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH)  155 
In addition, an expanding workforce brought skills and experience, and a re-organization of 156 
the department reflected and consolidated the focus on chronic disease prevention. A Division 157 
of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion was swiftly created under the new administration 158 
and later broken up into bureaus. For the first time, staff was allocated specifically to several 159 
high-burden chronic diseases such as diabetes.42 As staff numbers grew, more specialized 160 
programs and bureaus were created, including the Physical Activity and Nutrition Program that 161 
became part of the new Bureau of Chronic Disease Prevention and Control. 162 
“The Chronic Disease Bureau did grow under the Bloomberg Administration, but it existed 163 
previously because they did have a smaller program [...] particularly around maternal and 164 
infant health and in tobacco control. So the Bureau grew by leaps and bounds during my time 165 
under the Bloomberg Administration.” (Interviewee 5, DOHMH) 166 
Current DOHMH expertise covers the whole spectrum of obesity prevention, from regulatory 167 
and programmatic work to other essential components of the policy development and 168 
implementation process, such as the ability to generate data and conduct outreach: 169 
“The Bureau […] encompasses all the obesity work, and includes the policy work […], a 170 
research and evaluation unit […], a programmatic unit […] and a communications unit. […] 171 
Because there is now a policy unit, the way that the department is structured around this, I think 172 
[it] streamlines a lot of things and it is a very nimble unit.” (Interviewee 3, DOHMH) 173 
Against the backdrop of these enduring organizational changes, interviewees disagreed about 174 
the future of obesity prevention in New York City. Some regarded the end of the Bloomberg era 175 
as synonymous with the end of innovative public health interventions:  176 
“We had this window. We had to take it. [...] I knew that when Mayor Bloomberg left that 177 
our power would disappear.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 178 
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Others pointed out the continuity in terms of expertise and commitment at agency level. They 179 
also observed change in institutional awareness and knowledge on nutrition:  180 
“I think that there has been a shift nationally and locally on these issues. […] The rationale 181 
and the knowledge no longer just live with us. It’s a lot easier to have those conversations 182 
even within the agency these days because we’ve done all this work, but because they’re a 183 
part of the conversation to begin with.” (Interviewee 2, DOHMH) 184 
Accordingly, despite Bloomberg’s pivotal role as catalyst and enabler of policy change, 185 
institutional reform preceded policy development and had a lasting impact on policy priorities.  186 
3.2. Evidence-driven framing of the problem and possible intervention points  187 
Building a case for action on obesity, the first issue identified in the IOTF’s framework, was 188 
also a starting point for NYC policy-makers. All interviewees identified problem severity, 189 
particularly the high and increasing prevalence of obesity and related chronic diseases, as the 190 
driving force behind policy initiation:  191 
“We really saw it as a major public health crisis - one that was increasing, unlike almost all 192 
of our other major health problems, which were getting better. (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 193 
The consistent and heavy use of evidence by NYC policy-makers has been noted previously, 194 
particularly their critical evaluation of published research and collection of local epidemiological 195 
data.43 Local studies included the newly instituted annual Community Health Survey42 and the 196 
more specific NYC Health and Nutrition Examination Survey whose first iteration in 2004 found 197 
high prevalence of metabolic syndrome and measures of obesity among New Yorkers and 198 
particularly minority residents.44 This reinforced an earlier study’s findings that 53% of New 199 
York City adults were overweight or obese and a quarter of residents of neighborhoods in 200 
Harlem, the Bronx, and central Brooklyn obese.45 The problem statements introducing the rules 201 
on trans-fats46, calorie posting47,48 and soda portion size49,50 made extensive reference to obesity 202 
prevalence data from these sources. In addition, other observational data indicating shifting 203 
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consumer behavior, including a substantial increase in the proportion of average food budgets 204 
spent on prepared food, were used to define areas for intervention. Locally, DOHMH studies 205 
analyzed food environments and consumption patterns, primarily in neighborhoods with 206 
particularly dire health indicators. This research identified drinks as prominent characteristics 207 
the limited availability of healthy foods and beverages, coupled with cost and quality concerns, 208 
the ubiquity of unhealthy foods and other unhealthy foods, and high consumption of sugary 209 
beverages.51-60 210 
Within the IOTF framework, identifying potential points of intervention (issue 2) and 211 
instruments with which to respond (issue 3) are underpinned by the choice to view obesity as an 212 
issue amenable to successful local government intervention. Kingdon conceptualizes this as the 213 
differentiation between condition and problem, subject to a “perceptual interpretative 214 
element”.25, p.110 This involved understanding obesity as not only a problem for the federal 215 
government, but also for local government. Accordingly, interviewees consistently viewed 216 
obesity as a societal problem requiring a systemic response. City government was seen to be in 217 
a position to change the food environment, with regulatory action considered an effective and 218 
expedient tool. This shifting focus is also evident in the City's strategic health agenda: the 219 
inaugural 2004 ‘Take Care New York’ outlines individual-level actions for residents to take, 220 
while the 2012 version privileges government action on socioeconomic levers, such as food 221 
environment.61-63 As one interviewee explained, the concentration on regulatory competencies 222 
followed an early “across-the-board effort within the Health Department to update the Health 223 
Code” (Interviewee 5, DOHMH) to align with expert evidence. In addition, the administration’s 224 
perception that regulatory measures could be used to address chronic disease risk factors was 225 
reinforced by parallel evidence from successful tobacco control measures: 226 
“Having achieved [tobacco control] as the first priority under the Bloomberg administration 227 
around public health I think gave confidence and maybe more political will- hey, this worked, 228 
and we should maybe think about that for obesity. [...] The fact that they were able to 229 
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operationalize it successfully kept that partnership [between Mayor and Health 230 
Commissioner] going and created leverage and political will.” (Interviewee 5, DOHMH) 231 
In summary, epidemiological evidence, often collected directly at city and neighborhood 232 
level, underpinned the framing of obesity as a societal problem and served to identify possible 233 
intervention points within that paradigm.  234 
3.3. Choosing interventional targets: the primacy of feasibility  235 
Despite substantial evidence attesting to the high prevalence of obesity and associated risk 236 
factors, decision-makers had to select concrete regulatory measures without much knowledge of 237 
their potential impact. Policy design therefore relied on program logic and practical feasibility. 238 
Interviewees noted the dearth of research on effectiveness in real-life settings: 239 
“We were really charting the course of trying to implement what people were saying on paper 240 
should be done around policy and practice to prevent obesity, but we didn’t have a blueprint.” 241 
(Interviewee 5, DOHMH)  242 
To mitigate the risks in making policies with incomplete evidence, the IOTF advocates a 243 
portfolio approach (issue 5), i.e. mixing interventions based on varying anticipated effectiveness 244 
and projected overall impact.26 This is based on the observation that resource-intensive small-245 
scale interventions, typically directed at high-risk groups, usually come with good evidence of 246 
effectiveness. By contrast, potentially high-impact population-wide approaches remain largely 247 
untested and often involve longer and more contextualized pathways between intervention and 248 
desired outcome. Selecting a mix of interventions serves two purposes: it helps address the multi-249 
faceted causes and mediators of obesity. It can also counterbalance the risks associated with 250 
implementing promising population-wide interventions whose outcomes are estimated mostly 251 
through extrapolation and logic.26 As a result, the IOTF considers such prospective evaluation 252 
(issue 4) the most challenging.26 However, the NYC experience suggests that the selection of a 253 
comprehensive portfolio can be even more difficult. Two reasons account for this: firstly, the 254 
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explicit shift to population-wide interventions operates independently from interventions 255 
targeting small high-risk groups. Secondly, a mix of measures as the ideal theoretical end point 256 
undervalues incremental policy-making essential to innovation: evaluation results and political 257 
experiences need to feed back into future policy making and act as stepping stones for new 258 
initiatives. Accordingly, rather than assembling a comprehensive portfolio, practical 259 
considerations and a case-by case attitude driven by a sense of urgency characterized the 260 
Bloomberg administration’s approach:  261 
“I’d like to say that it had a whole sequenced strategic plan but it didn’t. We had lots of ideas, 262 
ones we felt we had a decent chance of success, which would have a big impact, we tried. We 263 
all- I certainly during my time- had this intense sense of time being short. Even a successful 264 
idea can take you a couple of years […], so we just had to get the ones done while we had the 265 
opportunity. […] So, no, we didn’t think too much about it- this works, what will we do next.” 266 
(Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 267 
Consequently, research evidence quantifying the problem and identifying broad areas for 268 
intervention also figured heavily in justification of the choice and design of interventions. The 269 
trans-fat restriction proposal offers an example of the line of reasoning used in the absence of 270 
conclusive evidence. With data on population-wide health impact lacking, DOHMH based their 271 
case on the logic that removing a problem should naturally translate into positive health impact: 272 
with the increased share of calories consumed away from home, the prohibition of trans-fats 273 
would substantially reduce associated harmful effects. The notice of adoption estimates that 274 
between 6% and 23% of coronary heart disease cases could be prevented.46 The upper estimate 275 
is the pooled relative risk increase associated with elevated trans-fat intake from a meta-analysis 276 
of cohort studies,64 illustrating the equating of problem magnitude and impact. To alleviate 277 
concerns that the new rule would harm industry, DOHMH was able to draw on precedent from 278 
Denmark.46 Authoritative opinion such as recommendations by the US Department of 279 
Agriculture and the American Heart Association as well as prior political action at federal level 280 
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indicating general support for similar measures rounded out the argument in both policy 281 
documents46-48 and interviewees’ accounts of the process:  282 
“[A] very sound rich body of scientific literature, [including] at the time a fairly recent article 283 
by Mozaffarian that laid out the impact on coronary heart disease, led to identifying trans-fat 284 
as something that the department wanted to focus on. In addition, the F.D.A. had a couple of 285 
years prior required the labelling on nutrition facts panels of trans-fat. Prior to that it would’ve 286 
been less feasible, though I guess doable.” (Interviewee 2, DOHMH)  287 
The ability to isolate problem factors accounts for a large part of feasibility considerations: 288 
“We recognized that trans-fats weren’t contributing to the obesity problem. They were a 289 
nutritional problem - probably not the biggest nutritional problem in America, but they were 290 
one that you could isolate off because it was an artificial chemical that shouldn’t have been 291 
in the food supply in the first place and we could just ban it. You couldn’t do that with 292 
saturated fats. You couldn’t do that with sugar.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH)  293 
Policy-makers put in place accompanying programmatic interventions designed to facilitate the 294 
switch and even pushed back deadlines in response to industry complaints.20 In retrospect, 295 
interviewees appeared almost surprised how easily the rule was implemented and met targets:   296 
“The restaurants just called their suppliers and said, “Send me the trans-fat free oil”, and they 297 
sent it and they used that. […] There was great fear that restaurants would switch from trans-298 
fat to saturated fat and it might make things worse. […] There was also fear in the industry 299 
that it was going to be costly or that the products wouldn’t taste good […]. All that proved to 300 
be unfounded. Change proved to be very easy, and so despite the fact that we expected a law 301 
suit, we didn’t even get sued.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 302 
Similar to the argument around the restriction of trans-fats, interviewees pointed to the ease with 303 
which sugar-sweetened beverages could be isolated given their lack of nutritional value and 304 
major contribution to excess caloric intake:  305 
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“[A] concern I had about the rule, but which I think the health department did a very good 306 
job of allaying […] was ‘why do you stop at soda’. If I go to the movies and buy a 24 ounce 307 
soda and a large popcorn, there are more calories in the popcorn than in the soda. And the 308 
response was, there is some nutritional value in popcorn, there is no redeeming nutritional 309 
value in high fructose corn syrup, it’s pure calories.” (Interviewee 4, Board of Health) 310 
This argument worked for trans-fats and soda, but could not be applied to calorie posting:  311 
“The intent in terms of health impact between the two policies is different. […] A lot of the 312 
rationale for calorie labeling was just about consumer education. So that could be equated to 313 
tobacco control measures and policies in terms of warning labels. And not that that was the 314 
rationale that was used, but this concept of consumer education and transparency, here we’re 315 
providing information so that consumers could make better, more informed choices in the 316 
hopes that that would reduce calorie consumption. And clearly stating upfront that it needed 317 
to be evaluated, and should be evaluated.” (Interviewee 2, DOHMH) 318 
While the problem statement put forward in the notices47,48 is almost identical to the trans-fat 319 
rule, the original justification for calorie posting largely sidestepped estimates of its impact on 320 
consumption. Instead, the rationale was presented as a response to consumer acceptance of 321 
federally mandated nutrition labels on pre-packaged foods and to opinion polls supportive of 322 
calorie information in restaurants.47 Rather than discussing the unclear anticipated effect on 323 
obesity, these arguments appear to justify the proposed intervention as in step with societal 324 
expectations.  The suggestion is that this “probably reassured the board that its moves were not 325 
so far out in front of public opinion as to threaten its institutional legitimacy.”65, p.2018 It is only 326 
in the revised proposal that additional research conducted by the department prompted a more 327 
ambitious estimate of anticipated effects on consumption. The repeal and reenactment of the 328 
regulation in modified form followed a lawsuit brought by the New York State Restaurant 329 
Association. The rule was invalidated by the United States District Court for the Southern 330 
District of New York on the grounds that it was pre-empted by federal law on voluntary nutrition 331 
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claims.10,66,67 However, by extending the scope of the original regulation to all chain restaurants 332 
rather than only those that provide calorie information in some form, legal obstacles could be 333 
addressed.10,67 In its re-submission to the Board of Health, DOHMH estimated that the new rule 334 
would lead to “at least 150,000 fewer New Yorkers [becoming] obese, resulting […] in at least 335 
30,000 fewer cases of diabetes” over the following five years.48  This estimate was based on 336 
consumer responses to Starbuck’s voluntary introduction of a rudimentary form of calorie 337 
posting while the regulation was suspended due to the lawsuit. DOHMH research48 found that 338 
just under one third of consumers reported noticing the new information. Purchases by this 339 
segment of customers contained, on average, 48 fewer calories according to early data presented 340 
in the notice and 52 fewer calories according to the final published research.48,51 341 
Overall, policy development was consistently anchored in research evidence. However, 342 
policy-makers also demonstrated a willingness to take a leap of faith where concrete outcomes 343 
could only be predicted based on extrapolation and assumptions. Similarly, the administration 344 
actively contributed to the evidence base by conducting in depth evaluations generating part of 345 
the evidence that was found lacking.  346 
3.4. Balancing expert policy and decision-making with community involvement 347 
Removing agenda-setting, policy development, and formal decision-making from the usual 348 
legislative realm and instead going down the regulatory route with the Board of Health made the 349 
entire process of policy making largely expert-driven. 350 
“Any time that anywhere legislative people tried to use a legislative process, it opened up the 351 
process to lobbying and industry groups coming and interrupting that process, or coming in 352 
with reasons why it would affect their businesses and that wasn’t the case in any changes that 353 
were made to the Health Code. [...] I feel one of the reasons why we were able to get things 354 
done is because we had local regulations in place, and we were not beholden to elected 355 
officials and as much of the politic process.” (Interviewee 5, DOHMH) 356 
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Rather than representing any particular constituencies or interests outside the health realm, the 357 
Board is required by law to be made up of five members that hold medical degrees and another 358 
five with advanced degrees in a defined health-related discipline.68 As a result, where the Board 359 
is involved, decision-makers belong to the same community of experts as those who develop the 360 
policy proposals and can reasonably be expected to share similar views.  361 
“Most of us keep abreast of the developments in medicine and public health, and are well 362 
aware of the role that sugary beverages have played in the obesity epidemic. And we 363 
reviewed, as part of the rule making process, a lot of the background documents, a lot of the 364 
scientific studies.” (Interviewee 7, City Health Board) 365 
However, keeping all aspects of policy-making within the expert realm and moving quickly to 366 
maximize the number of initiatives attempted during the exceptionally supportive and expert-367 
inclined mayoralty of Michael Bloomberg entailed sacrifices: where time was judged too short 368 
to build public support for regulatory actions that would not directly be the subject of electoral 369 
or legislative scrutiny, a lack of community engagement ultimately emerged as a threat. 370 
Interviewees described policy development as “very guarded” (Interviewee 5, DOHMH) and 371 
confined to the “four walls of the Health Department” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) until a fully 372 
fleshed out policy would be floated and rapidly prepared for formal decision-making. Some 373 
participants argued that a degree of institutional secrecy was justified:  374 
“New York City is a media center and especially after the early successes in tobacco, the press 375 
was always looking at us ready to write a story. There is nothing we could develop [...] without 376 
fear that it might leak out in the development process and we would get an embarrassing story 377 
and end up really hurting our ability to get it done. So everything was done with the greatest 378 
secrecy and determination that no one who wasn’t in the Department could hear about this until 379 
the plan was fully finished.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 380 
Others pointed out that these isolationist tendencies came at the expense of preparatory work: 381 
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“I think they got a little cocky because of the success of some of the earlier initiatives. […] The 382 
smoking stuff, for all the initial grumbling, got great press. And I think they got a little cocky, 383 
didn’t do their political homework well enough. […] The problem was not with group politics, 384 
but with public perception […]. They might have done better to have spent six months or a 385 
year in a public relations kind of campaign and doing more public education on the subject. It 386 
would have been great to have some African-American athlete or celebrity be a spokesperson 387 
for this kind of proposal.” (Interviewee 4, Board of Health) 388 
The lack of community support became most relevant in relation to the ultimately failed attempts 389 
to address sugary beverage consumption through a state tax, exclusion from SNAP (Supplemental 390 
Nutrition Assistance Program/food stamp) benefits, and the portion cap rule. Predictably, lobbying 391 
efforts by the beverage industry were perceived as a major stumbling block in swaying public 392 
opinion and gaining legislative support. But while usual industry arguments centered on personal 393 
choice and responsibility were widely expected, industry efforts to capitalize on the diversity of 394 
NYC constituencies caught policy-makers by surprise. 395 
“The group that I think surprised us the most and disappointed us the most were the minority 396 
groups. On the food stamp proposal in particular, the hunger advocates came out very vocally 397 
against that. We were presented as somehow we were being mean to poor people. [...] With 398 
the portion cap, I was really shocked and terribly disappointed at the civil rights groups that 399 
came out against it [such as] the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of 400 
Colored People].” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 401 
During the public comment periods for the three rules that came before the board, the joint 402 
original proposal on trans-fat and calorie posting received approximately 2,200 comments, with 403 
99% supportive of the trans-fat proposal and 97% supportive of calorie posting.46,47 By contrast, 404 
the soda portion size rule yielded approximately 32,000 comments in support and 6,000 in 405 
opposition (~ 84% positive).69 Despite the fact that, in all cases, written comments and oral 406 
testimony were strongly coordinated by public health advocacy organizations and researchers, 407 
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much greater participation on the soda rule, particularly in opposition, highlights clear 408 
differences in reception. Questioning of the overall regulatory strategy itself ultimately 409 
contributed to courts considering the regulation “arbitrary and capricious”.12,70,71 Reference to 410 
jurisdictional limitations, namely that “food retail stores like supermarkets, bodegas, and 411 
pharmacies are not subject to the proposed rule because they are regulated by the State 412 
Department of Agriculture and Markets”69 was seen as inadequate to address this criticism.  413 
At the same time, industry behavior motivated at least one Board of Health member to vote 414 
in favor of the soda portion cap, despite concerns over the measure’s incomplete reach:  415 
“The industry people were so obnoxious and so offensive that they lost me entirely. […] The 416 
other thing that really bothered me is they really did a good job, from a political and public 417 
relations point of view, buying off minority politicians. One of the speakers at the public 418 
hearing was a City Council member from Central Harlem who read a statement that had 419 
clearly been prepared by the beverage companies.” (Interviewee 4, Board of Health)  420 
This sentiment was echoed by other interviewees who also commented on the widespread 421 
misrepresentation of the rule’s content by industry lobbyists and in media coverage.  422 
“In almost all the media coverage it was referred to as a soda ban, as if we were completely 423 
banning soda, as if we were taking away people's rights. After the media campaign [and after] 424 
pour[ing] a lot of money into groups to protest the rule, surveys were done asking New 425 
Yorkers, do you think the soda ban is a good idea or bad idea? 60% thought the soda ban, and 426 
again it wasn't even really a ban, was a bad idea.” (Interviewee 7, Board of Health)  427 
In summary, the expert-driven approach helped focus policy design on research evidence 428 
without dilution by private interests, but policy-making in relative isolation from public debate 429 
also left room for the public discussion to be seized by industry.  430 
3.5. Regulatory obesity prevention within the wider health and social policy agenda 431 
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Generally supportive members of the Board of Health and the City Council had some 432 
reservations about the use of government regulation to reduce soda consumption, particularly in 433 
terms of a dichotomy with equitable access to healthy food: 434 
“I worry a little bit about that sort of public health approach to obesity […] Nobody has to 435 
smoke, everybody has to eat, they’re different cases. There is such a powerful socioeconomic 436 
gradient associated with obesity and access to healthier alternatives, both in terms of foods 437 
and in terms of life circumstances between lower income communities and upper income 438 
communities. […] So, I would prefer a world for obesity in which we were in the position [of 439 
providing] more positive assistance for people eating more healthily and exercising more and 440 
leading more healthy lives.” (Interviewee 4, Board of Health) 441 
“Philosophically, I would say we in the City Council had a slightly different take. [...] The 442 
Mayor looked a lot at this through the concept of food choices in a somewhat punitive way, 443 
let’s limit access to this and that. [...] Where we saw things slightly differently is I’m a big 444 
advocate, as was the Council, for food access. I believe that partially why people make bad 445 
choices is because they don’t understand how many calories things have, what they translate 446 
into, but also because they don’t have any other choice.” (Interviewee 6, City Council) 447 
Similarly, the federal Department of Agriculture ultimately decided its rejection of New York 448 
City’s SNAP exclusion request by reference to its “longstanding tradition of supporting and 449 
promoting incentive-based solutions to the obesity epidemic”.13 Against this backdrop, access to 450 
healthy food in particular was seen by the City Council as an area in which executive initiative 451 
was lacking. This perception may be attributed to DOHMH view of food access and obesity 452 
prevention as complementary, but not identical issues: 453 
“That whole concept of food deserts caught on at that time […], so there was an interest in the 454 
City Council, there was an interest in the Deputy Mayor’s Office and so they created this Food 455 
Policy Coordinator really around increasing access to healthy foods, not so much obesity 456 
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prevention. Later, the two themes sort of merged, but that came from a totally different 457 
direction.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 458 
“They’re related to each other by improving the food environment by bringing fruits and 459 
vegetables in, by reducing the marketing because you’re now marketing fruits and vegetables 460 
or something else instead, you are displacing and changing the unhealthy food environment 461 
at the same time. […] But I think in that sense there is a stronger community coalition around 462 
that work, it’s in a more natural alignment.” (Interviewee 3, DOHMH) 463 
Adding to may be mixed local evidence regarding the relationship between food insecurity and 464 
obesity prevalence: local studies demonstrated an association of obesity with socioeconomic 465 
status72,73 and an association between neighborhood socioeconomic status and fast 466 
food/convenience store density.74-76 At the same time, research did not find any consistent, 467 
population-wide association between food insecurity77-79 and the relationship between obesity 468 
and food outlet density appeared more complex than hypothesized.80-82 In its response to 469 
comments on the soda portion cap favoring better education and food access, DOHMH pointed 470 
to less publicized regulatory changes and programmatic interventions.69 In addition to a variety 471 
of school food changes,83 these included the 2006 Regulation of Nutrition in Child Care 472 
Facilities,84 the 2012 Regulation of Nutritional Requirements for Children's Camps85 and 473 
Executive Order No. 122586 applying food standards to city food procurement.87 Following an 474 
agreement between City Council and Mayor, the order also added a Food Policy Coordinator to 475 
the Deputy Mayor’s office. The position addressed the general absence of horizontal approaches 476 
and bridged some of the dissonance between Council and DOHMH.  477 
Local health departments’ capacity to initiate and coordinate “cross-agency conversations 478 
and policymaking [in order to] insert health concerns into a vast range of policymaking activities 479 
within their jurisdictions”88 has been increasingly stressed, often by reference to NYC. Yet, 480 
instead of a systematic Health in All Policies approach, engagement in obesity prevention was 481 
based on office-holders’ personal interest: 482 
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“In an informal way, that happened just when ideas got floated around City Hall. And there 483 
was a deputy mayor sitting at City Hall who was over health as well as the social service 484 
agencies and so that deputy mayor, to a certain extent, was an advocate for health 485 
considerations in anything that was happening. But there wasn’t any formal adoption of Health 486 
in All Policy.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 487 
The new role and its authority to develop city-wide food standards in cooperation with the 488 
Health Commissioner formalized cooperation at least on food policy matters. It presents a focal 489 
point for whole-of-government representation and advocacy, while recognizing that while  490 
“DOHMH is widely understood to have the content expertise on this issue […], this role 491 
focuses on building collaboration between and among about 15 agencies who have some 492 
operational role in food, so it's all about collaboration.  Our success also depends on 493 
cooperation with New York State and regular[ meetings] with similarly situated food policy 494 
advisors in cities nationwide.” (Interviewee 8, City Hall) 495 
“Food and hunger and nutrition has been siloed in health, and I think that’s a mistake. So that 496 
is something we wanted to break through by having a Mayor’s office who would have a 497 
tremendous convening power at the highest levels of government, for all of the city agencies.” 498 
(Interviewee 6, City Council) 499 
To this end, the Food Policy Task Force brought together representatives from City Hall, the 500 
Departments of Health and Education, the City Council, and others to work together on policy 501 
proposals around access to healthy food. A 2008 internal review concluded that “although most 502 
of the City’s food programs are developed within specific agencies, the Food Policy Coordinator 503 
appears to have been able to promote coordination between different agency initiatives, reduce 504 
programmatic overlap, improve inter-agency communications, and ultimately help bring the 505 
initiatives to fruition”.89 One of those initiatives established 1,000 permits for Green Carts, 506 
mobile food vendors providing fruits and vegetables to underserved areas.90,91 The initiative 507 
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encountered unexpectedly harsh opposition from bodega owners and other businesses, similar to 508 
the reception the soda portion rule would receive a few years later.  509 
“It was such ill-conceived opposition, because they don’t carry fruits and vegetables. Yes, if 510 
we were selling soda on the street it would have been tremendous competition, but it really 511 
was not going to be competition. [The opposition was] very well organized. The bodegas have 512 
business associations; they give a lot of donations. The Korean business association which 513 
owns a lot of greenmarkets is very well organized. I thought they would be opposed, I didn’t 514 
think they would be that opposed.” (Interviewee 6, City Council) 515 
The Food Policy Coordinator was credited in part with the eventual passage of the bill despite 516 
this opposition, making it “more palatable to Council members because it was part of a larger, 517 
coherent City food policy” and leveraging “relationships with community based organizations 518 
[that] were critical in the development of a coalition of more than 100 organizations that 519 
supported the Green Cart legislation”89 Current initiatives advanced within the Food Policy 520 
Coordinator’s mandate to “increase access to and utilization of food support programs”86 build 521 
on existing infrastructure rather than aiming for new regulation or legislation: 522 
“Our goal is to maximize federal dollars available through the SNAP and School Food 523 
programs. This means increasing enrolment in SNAP among historically under-enrolled 524 
populations and taking advantage of new provisions that allow us to apply for universal free 525 
lunch in schools, and to mandate ‘Breakfast after the Bell’.” (Interviewee 9, City Hall) 526 
Both the executive and the legislative branch claim responsibility for early rule changes and 527 
programs around access to healthy foods:  528 
“I would say actually we started with trying to increase access to healthy food- New York 529 
City Health Bucks, that was the idea there- and with the Healthy Bodegas Initiative- that was 530 
again the idea of increasing access to healthier foods.“(Interviewee 5, DOHMH) 531 
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“We put funding in the budget to expand greenmarkets in low income areas, and to purchase 532 
for the greenmarkets the technological equipment needed to allow farmers to take food 533 
stamps. Now the distinction there is, an executive, in the budget, looks at it thinking big city 534 
wide things. This is a smaller funding program, a couple of million dollars, but that’s typically 535 
what a legislature does. […] We as the City Council also passed the first ever zoning laws to 536 
incentivize supermarkets in low income areas, called Fresh Zoning. […] Basically it says if 537 
you put a supermarket in your first floor, you can build a bigger building.” (Interviewee 6, 538 
City Council) 539 
In 2005, DOHMH introduced Health Bucks which supplements food stamps spent at NYC 540 
greenmarkets with additional vouchers for fresh fruits and vegetables. The program built on an 541 
initiative, funded by the City Council since 2006, to facilitate the use of newly introduced 542 
electronic food stamps at greenmarkets. The example of these programs provides evidence of 543 
highly complementary initiatives from executive and legislature, but the relationship with 544 
DOHMH was judged uneven by the City Council. An Obesity Task Force, also convened under 545 
the auspices of the Food Policy Coordinator, assembled representatives from city agencies and 546 
the Mayor’s Office, but not the City Council. Plans outlined in its 2012 report92 included a range 547 
of activities related to healthy food access and nutrition education, but the most thoroughly 548 
presented proposal was the soda portion cap for which legislative support turned out to be clearly 549 
lacking. In addition, there was also a preference for executive solutions where legislative political 550 
will could have been leveraged: 551 
“Actually, [for] the trans-fat issue and the calorie count, we had Council members that wanted 552 
to pass legislation to do that. […] After the Board did it we actually passed legislation to 553 
codify it, so that if a future mayor wanted to get rid of it they would have to actually repeal it. 554 
[…] It was odd, now that I think about it, it was not consistent. [...] They may have then been 555 
less collaborative with the things they were going to try jam through the Board of Health.” 556 
(Interviewee 6, City Council) 557 
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Overall, the perceived dichotomy between obesity prevention and food access put the 558 
Bloomberg administration at odds not only with anti-hunger and civil rights advocates, but also 559 
with the City Council. Ceding some exclusive control over strategic directions and integrating 560 
the two issues through the Food Policy Coordinator position helped the Department of Health to 561 
maximize policy outcomes where political agreement could be reached.  562 
3.6. Procedural and substantive limits to harnessing city regulatory powers  563 
There was notable appreciation of the regulatory powers of the Board of Health, with one 564 
member describing it as “far and away the most powerful government body with which I have 565 
ever been associated” (Interviewee 4, Board of Health). However, the limits of executive rule-566 
making and city authority in a federal system became very apparent. Pre-emption at state and 567 
federal level in taxation and SNAP implementation rules prevented the city from enacting a sugary 568 
beverage tax locally and banning soda from food stamp eligibility. At the same time, the at times 569 
strained relationship between legislative and executive branches and two court decisions 570 
overturning the soda portion size cap illustrates the limits of executive action, particularly where 571 
it follows the previous legislative failure of related proposals. The final ruling by the State Court 572 
of Appeals, held that the Board of Health did “exceed the scope of its regulatory authority” and 573 
“engaged in lawmaking [that] infringed upon the legislative jurisdiction of the City Council”,12 574 
which by all accounts would have opposed the measure. Concern that such a ruling would 575 
severely restrict the executive in developing innovative regulatory approaches does not appear 576 
to have been a major concern at the time: 577 
“[The threat of a lawsuit] might deter us if we thought we would be sued […] because of the 578 
political price you pay for losing a lawsuit.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH)  579 
However, with the rule struck down, the general assumption that “agency rulemaking receives 580 
deferential judicial review”70 has been invalidated. This, in turn, may influence both future 581 
judiciary decisions and executive policy-making. One interviewee even voiced concern about 582 
spill-over effects on the Board’s authority in infectious disease, concluding that  583 
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“it was a little irresponsible to play fast and loose with those [powers] the way they did with 584 
the soda ban.” (Interviewee 6, City Council) 585 
On the other hand, in the NYC context, the soda portion cap also shows how the failure of one 586 
policy gave rise to creative thinking about alternatives: 587 
“It's my recollection that there was a general thought in public health to think about other 588 
strategies besides a tax that might be effective. […] Because the tax proposals met with such 589 
opposition the thinking was let's try something else. (Interviewee 7, Board of Health) 590 
All major policies were evaluated and findings disseminated in academic journals as part of the 591 
administration’s commitment93 to building the evidence base. In the short term, none of the NYC 592 
interventions substantially reduced calorie intake: measures targeting food access rather than 593 
obesity directly achieved some success in adding healthy choices to the food environment and in 594 
increasing the use of SNAP benefits at farmers’ markets.19,21,22,94,95 With regard to interventions 595 
that made calorie intake a direct evaluation metric, calorie posting did not change restaurant 596 
purchases, despite moderate increases in the number of patrons who reported noticing the 597 
information.16-18,96-98 Nevertheless, policies that fail to live up to their anticipated direct impact 598 
may still achieve a degree of success not captured by evaluation designs: 599 
“[Research on the effect of calorie posting] still doesn’t capture the full impact because 600 
anecdotally people have talked about changing either patterns of purchases, they used to get 601 
it every morning and now they only get it once a week, or that they saw that they purchased 602 
a large amount of calories and compensated later in the day.” (Interviewee 2, DOHMH) 603 
Most importantly, this regulation as well as proposed policies that were not enacted or 604 
implemented such as the three failed soda initiatives may have changed attitudes and behaviors 605 
more widely and ultimately contributed to positive health impacts.  606 
“Life expectancy expanded dramatically during the Bloomberg administration.  […] Sugary 607 
drink consumption is plummeting and we have good data on that. Childhood obesity rates are 608 
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also going down in New York City right now. So a lot of things did succeed in the ultimate 609 
thing we care about, even though some of the policies themselves didn’t go through.” 610 
(Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 611 
Indeed, New York experienced a general increase in life-expectancy that outpaced national 612 
trends99 and obesity prevalence among city elementary and middle school students decreased by 613 
5.5% between 2006/07 and 2010/11.100 In addition, a study of obesity prevalence among children 614 
from low-income families receiving benefits under the federal WIC scheme was conducted 615 
before and after the entry into force of the new childcare regulations in 2007.101 This research 616 
showed that early childhood obesity declined across New York City, with larger decreases 617 
observed in neighbourhoods classed as high-risk.101 However, these improvements, often 618 
observed in studies with ecological design, do not allow any claim of causality in relation to food 619 
policy. Nevertheless, antismoking laws, the first priority of the Bloomberg administration and 620 
“associations with both citywide and targeted policies”,99 which would certainly include food 621 
policy, are suggested as potential contributors to improved life-expectancy. Regardless of their 622 
ultimate attributable health impact, these controversial regulatory measures, including those not 623 
implemented, may have changed attitudes and behaviors simply through the extensive public and 624 
political debate they generated:  625 
“Even though we lost all those major policies [on sugary drinks], in focus groups people now 626 
all tell us, ‘oh yeah, that stuff is bad, I’m trying not to drink it’. So we have changed the image 627 
of that product in the city. That is a success that we didn’t expect, but we’re pleased it happened. 628 
I think, in general, there’s a dynamic relationship between messages you hear in the media and 629 
policy change. Messages can enable policy changes to occur. Policy changes can enable the 630 
national conversation to change.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 631 
Consequently, while key interventions did not result in substantially altered consumption 632 
patterns or never made it to implementation, the overall policy effort may have contributed to 633 
obesity prevention. In particular, the contentious and highly politicized debates around proposed 634 
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measures likely had a constructive effect in increasing public awareness and paving the way for 635 
easier passage of future regulation. 636 
3.7. Recommendations proposed by NYC policymakers  637 
The lessons and recommendations for other jurisdictions put forward by interviewees 638 
coalesced around three themes directly connected to key issues encountered during the policy-639 
development, decision, and implementation processes. Interviewees stressed the importance of 640 
creating supportive public opinion to stave off opposition, particularly from well-resourced 641 
industry. Targeted community outreach beyond mass education campaigns was seen as a key 642 
ingredient. They also expressed the sentiment that shifting the focus from changing the behavior 643 
of consumers to changing corporate behavior could reframe interventions as a question of justice 644 
and social responsibility rather than a threat to individual choice. 645 
“We should have had a broad-based coalition so we’d have done more community organizing 646 
around it and made the case for community groups that this is a case where this big rich 647 
industry is making money, making profits, by making you sick. You should be angry about 648 
that and you should be working with us on this.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 649 
“I would recommend that there be a lot more community support building so that especially 650 
individuals and communities that are most affected by excessive soda consumption and 651 
obesity are on board with this.” (Interviewee 7, Board of Health) 652 
Others agreed that community outreach was necessary, but should not be the primary occupation 653 
of health departments. Instead, they advised harnessing relationships with experts, advocates, 654 
and the media to support political decision-making and influence public opinion: 655 
“I feel like that is what the public comment period was for. […] You can always do more on 656 
community engagement, but that’s more of the role of an advocacy organization than it is 657 
probably the Health Department’s or public agency’s. […] I think those relationships are 658 
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critical, but it’s not really the function of a public health agency to do direct community 659 
outreach- it’s to engage other stakeholders to do that outreach.” (Interviewee 5, DOHMH) 660 
“I think really knowing the evidence and a strong relationship with the researchers, because 661 
they can speak to that as an independent voice as it goes out. A strong understanding of the 662 
media landscape, journalists and publications that understand public health and you can talk to 663 
and really explain, because there is a big education piece.” (Interviewee 2, DOHMH) 664 
Interviewees also confirmed that a favorable constellation of circumstances similar to 665 
Kingdon’s three streams was instrumental in allowing measures to be formulated and 666 
implemented. In particular, political will, maximization of regulatory, expert-driven decision 667 
routes, technical expertise in the policy stream, and implementation capabilities were seen as 668 
critical components. However, in terms of concrete levers for future policy action in NYC, 669 
interviewees from all institutions echoed the view that the most conspicuous targets for 670 
regulatory action have already been addressed and other areas such as zoning are complex 671 
subject matters and more difficult to address from a legal and decision-making perspective.  672 
“Part of the truth is so much was done, I’m not sure how much low hanging fruit, no pun 673 
intended, there still is. [...] In part maybe it’s just stuff is harder and more time consuming 674 
now, and maybe there isn’t as much urgency because they want to continue what we did and 675 
see what that yields, and then go from there.” (Interviewee 6, City Council)  676 
With regard to possible actions in other jurisdictions, interviewees suggested that policy-makers 677 
should appreciate and take advantage of the role of municipal law-making in advancing a policy 678 
agenda in this area. This is an idea that has also been stressed in previous research.23,102 Decision-679 
makers should pay particular attention to the varying areas of legal authority within both the 680 
executive and legislative branches in their respective local entities.  681 
“My observation is that corporations have much more power at federal level than state, and 682 
more at state than at local. That’s why we were able to innovate at local level; we didn’t have 683 
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too much battling with corporations here. When we went to the state level, we got beat pretty 684 
bad by them. The history of tobacco control showed that the innovation starts at the local 685 
level and it spreads from there to the state.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 686 
“I think what you want to do is figure out ways that you act very locally, because that’s what 687 
a legislature can do that a mayor can’t. You want to find ways when your mayor does 688 
something right to back it up. And then use whatever type of particular legislative power you 689 
have as a city council, in some cities that’s zoning, in others it might be tax law, every city’s 690 
different, and use them creatively.” (Interviewee 6, City Council) 691 
The trailblazing function then, more so than individual policy success or evidence generation, 692 
was setting a nationally and internationally highly visible precedent of redefining what 693 
conceptually encompasses municipal responsibilities: 694 
“Up until this time, everybody looked to the federal government for leadership in public 695 
health and state and local governments were kind of the implementation arms. […] When a 696 
local health department said, ‘No, we’re actually going to create an agenda. We’re going to 697 
innovate here at the local level.’ that was a pretty radical idea- that a mayor would take on a 698 
public health agenda, nobody thought that would ever happen. That’s not what mayors do- 699 
mayors fight crime and pick up the garbage.” (Interviewee 1, DOHMH) 700 
No interviewee went so far as to suggest that regulatory intervention alone could substantially 701 
change consumption patterns. However, there was agreement on the intermediate effect of 702 
political discussion and accompanying programmatic work in changing social norms as well as 703 
strong sentiment that political responsibility for public health needs to be re-defined. 704 
4. Conclusions 705 
In this paper, we have provided an in depth analysis of policy-making in obesity prevention 706 
during the Bloomberg mayoralty. During this period, the New York City Department of Health 707 
championed a number of interventions that directly targeted nutritional intake through 708 
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regulation. These included instituting stringent standards in settings in which the city acts as food 709 
provider, removing trans-fats from restaurant food, requiring calorie posting in chain restaurants, 710 
restricting soda portion size, proposing a statewide sugary drinks excise tax, and enforcing 711 
stricter local rules for SNAP product eligibility. The latter three proposals were met with fierce 712 
resistance from various quarters, including minority business organizations, civil rights 713 
advocates, and the majority of the City Council. These stakeholders considered restrictive 714 
approaches inequitable or harmful to small businesses and preferred regulatory and 715 
programmatic work with a more enabling focus, such as access to healthy foods.  716 
Our analysis related the policy-making characteristics of key Bloomberg-era regulations to 717 
the models proposed by Kingdon and the International Obesity Task Force. While the 718 
observations reported here largely conform to the models, we observed two crucial differences: 719 
firstly, the involvement of the political stream was kept to a minimum due to the administration’s 720 
decision to keep decision-making largely within the domain of experts. At the same time, 721 
political will played an important role in initiating and sustaining policy development. Kingdon’s 722 
model does not foresee the development of innovative policies from theoretical research 723 
evidence nor does it take into account the need to first build capabilities for such policy 724 
development to occur. Conceptualizing policy-entrepreneurs as figures that pop up occasionally 725 
only to link pre-existing elements does not capture the strategic approach taken by Bloomberg 726 
and lower-level policy entrepreneurs in fundamentally changing administrative structures to 727 
sustain agenda change. Secondly, the expert decision-making routes favored by the Bloomberg 728 
administration presented the challenge of balancing institutional secrecy, maintained for fear of 729 
derailing policy development, with the need to build community and legislative support. The 730 
executive branch clearly underestimated the importance of the latter two elements when it 731 
decided to go down the regulatory route. As a result, the loss of the soda lawsuit, partially 732 
attributed to legislative and public opposition, is now regarded as a possible inhibitor for future 733 
policy innovation as the precedent weighs on future regulatory attempts. Nevertheless, there is 734 
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also anecdotal evidence that this and other widely discussed measures changed perceptions 735 
among policy-makers and the public nationally and internationally. 736 
Notwithstanding the crucial role of New York’s unconventional three-term Mayor, our 737 
findings may serve to encourage other jurisdictions that lack Bloomberg-style leadership to 738 
explore their options for regulatory obesity prevention. In particular, other jurisdictions should 739 
look to maintaining awareness of the problem and developing tailored solutions in anticipation 740 
of a change in political circumstances. This research should also encourage researchers to 741 
actively create policy entrepreneurs by disseminating relevant findings to receptive policy-742 
makers and by explaining the applicability of their research to specific jurisdictional contexts. 743 
At the same time, our research underscored that political action and public support for a 744 
particular public health agenda are intertwined and mutually supportive. This observation 745 
cautions against decoupling regulatory change from programmatic interventions and highlights 746 
the importance of community involvement through public education and participatory policy 747 
development. Intersectoral and inclusive policy development, while more cumbersome and 748 
drawn out in the short term, may prove advantageous in the long run by changing social norms 749 
and paving the way for implementation of publicly acceptable and politically sustainable 750 
interventions. Jurisdictions seeking to extract lessons should therefore also consider the limits of 751 
regulation in isolation. Despite the international buzz generated by the precedents set in NYC, 752 
decision-makers in this research clearly acknowledge the value of cross-sectoral health policy 753 
approaches. In addition, much of the impact of the proposed and implemented regulatory changes 754 
is described as increased awareness of the problem severity and risk factors in the general 755 
population and among policy-makers outside the public health field. Consequently, while New 756 
York City exemplifies innovative and pragmatic approaches to chronic disease prevention, it has 757 
not transformed conventional approaches to health policy-making nor would this be conducive 758 
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